LAW OF THE SEA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

John E. Noyes*
For some, the vision of international courts able to issue binding rules
of decision and clarify the meaning of rules of international law has had
great pull. For example, Hersch Lauterpacht urged that the International
Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) be given wide powers, and argued that
international courts and tribunals should treat even problems involving the
vital interests of states as justiciable.' With respect to the law of the sea in
particular, some have proposed that an international court exercise broad
jurisdiction. In Arvid Pardo's 1971 draft treaty, which proposed an
intergovernmental institution to govern ocean spaces, an International
Maritime Court was to play a central role.2 This Court was to have
jurisdiction over individuals and corporations, as well as states, "with
respect to matters ... in International Ocean Space." 3
Although no general Ocean Space institution emerged from the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS
III), the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea4 does
contain innovative provisions concerning dispute settlement. Even while
denying the need for an intergovernmental organization with broad powers,
some states at UNCLOS III favored a strong third-party system of dispute
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settlement as a means to help reinforce Convention norms.5 States favoring
a strong dispute settlement system, states expressing skepticism about
submitting disputes to third-party fora, and states seeking to have particular
issues exempted from compulsory third-party dispute settlement engaged in
complicated negotiations. 6 A compromise, under which many disputes
may be subject to compulsory binding arbitration or adjudication, emerged
from UNCLOS III. My remarks first briefly outline this compromise
dispute settlement system, and then analyze some of the factors bearing on
the current and future uses of the Convention's third-party mechanisms.

The dispute settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention
are found in the text of the Convention itself, rather than in an optional
protocol.7 The Convention calls first for informal efforts at resolving
disputes. Should these fail, States Parties have a choice among four third-

party dispute settlement mechanisms-arbitration, special arbitration, the
ICJ, and a new International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (hereinafter
ITLOS)-to handle many disputes!
If the parties to a dispute do not
choose the same forum, or if they fail to make any selection, an arbitral
tribunal usually has residual compulsory jurisdiction. 9 The ITLOS, rather
than an arbitral tribunal, has residual compulsory jurisdiction to order the
prompt release of vessels and their crews under Article 29210 or to order
provisional measures," though in the latter case only until an arbitral

tribunal (or some other forum acceptable to the parties) can be constituted.
Although States Parties cannot make reservations to the Convention to
avoid its dispute settlement provisions, Articles 297 and 298 do contain

limitations on and optional exceptions to the requirement of binding thirdparty adjudication or arbitration. These limitations and exceptions affect
several categories of sensitive disputes, involving, for example, military
5.
The United States, for example, favored a strong dispute settlement system. See Louis
B. Sohn, U.S. Policy Toward the Settlement ofLaw of the Sea Disputes, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1976).
6.
For the negotiating history of the dispute settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea
Convention, see A.O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DisPuTEs UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:

A DRAFTING HISTORY AND COMMENTARY

(1987); 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
(Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B. Sohn eds., 1989) [hereinafter 5 COMMENTARY].
7.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 4, arts. 74(2), 83(2), 151(8), 159(10),
162(2)(u)-(v), 165(2)(i)-(j), 186-191, 264, 279-99, 302; Annex m, arts. 18(l)(b), 21(2); Annex
V; Annex VI; Annex VII; Annex VIII; Annex IX, art. 7. See also infra note 13. Cf. Optional
Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 169 (ratified by 37 states).
8.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 4, art. 287. Special arbitration before panels
of experts is available in cases involving fisheries, protection of the marine environment, marine
scientific research, and navigation. See also id. art. 282.
9.
See id. art. 287(3), (5).
10. See id. art. 292(1).
11. See id. art. 290(5).
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activities, maritime boundaries, and aspects of coastal state jurisdiction in
the exclusive economic zone (hereinafter EEZ) concerning living resources
and marine scientific research. 2
Separate provisions apply to the
settlement of disputes relating to mining activities in the sea bed beyond
national jurisdiction, with respect to which a Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of
the Law of the Sea Tribunal is to play the primary role."
The Law of the Sea Convention, along with its compulsory third-party
dispute settlement provisions, entered into force in November 1994. The
Law of the Sea Tribunal elected its twenty-one judges in 1996, and in 19974
handed down .its first decision, in an Article 292 prompt release case.'
Earlier this year the Tribunal issued an order concerning a provisional
measure," and it is currently seized. with a related case in which the
applicant state has raised issues of freedom of navigation, hot pursuit,6 and
the scope of a coastal state's power to enforce its customs regulations.'
During the four years since the Convention has entered into force,
states have not brought many new law of the sea cases to international
courts or arbitral tribunals. Before the Convention entered into force, the
ICJ and arbitral tribunals had decided several law of the sea cases, many of
them brought via special agreement.' The baseline, as it were, of judicial
and arbitral activity relating to the law of the sea has for many years been
"some cases," even absent a widely adopted treaty establishing a system of
compulsory jurisdiction. I do not mean that the Convention's third-party
dispute settlement system has had no effect. I doubt, for example, that the
first case decided by the Law of the Sea Tribunal would have been
submitted to an international court without that system. But the number of
12. Some of the disputes falling within these limitations and exceptions are subject to a
system of compulsory conciliation. See id. arts. 297(2)(b) & (3)(b), 298(lXa), Annex V,arts. 11-14.
13. See id. arts. 186-91. The Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Dec. 1982, July 28, 1994, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/263, 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994), which modifies some of the technical and institutional
features of the Convention's regime for mining the deep sea bed that developed states had found
problematic, and which is to be interpreted and applied together with Part XI as a single instrument,
contains a few provisions on dispute settlement. See i. Annex, §§ 3.12, 6.1()-(g), 6.4, 8.1(f), 8(2).
None of these provisions affects the basic structure of dispute settlement under Part XI.
14. See The "M/V Saiga" (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea),
<httpr://www.un.org/Depts/los/judgl .htm> (1997).
15. The "M/V Saiga" (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Request for
Provisional Measures), <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ord1103.htm > (1998).
16. The pending case, the Article 292 decision, and the provisional order all arose from
the same incident. See ITLOS/Press 17, Oct. 19, 1998; ITLOS/Press 13, Feb. 28, 1998.
17. The ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of Intemational Justice, have handed
down some 40 decisions that directly involve the law of the sea. See Jonathan I. Charney, The
Iliadionsof Expding InternationalDisputeStement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea; 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 70 n.13 (1996); Mark W. Janis, The Law of the Sea Tribunal, in
INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENJRY 245, 247-48 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992).
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law of the sea cases is far less than, for example, the number of
international trade disputes submitted to WTO panels, which have rendered
over 100 binding interstate decisions since 1994."8

What factors explain this relative lack of interstate law of the sea cases?
First, many sensitive disputes have been exempted from the compulsory dispute
settlement requirement under Articles 297 and 298. In such disputes, a state
seeking a public third-party forum in which to air its grievances may well find
none available. Second, unlike the GATT/WTO or the European human rights
systems, the law of the sea has seen no experimentation with widely accepted
multilateral treaty-based dispute settlement mechanisms.' 9 Although states have
found recourse to third-party procedures useful in particular law of the sea
disputes, they have not had the opportunity to try out a compulsory dispute

settlement mechanism established in a widely accepted convention, or perhaps
to try out different mechanisms for different types of disputes. There has been
no time, following a period of use of a dispute settlement system, to discuss
possible reforms and perhaps to reach consensus on the need for incremental

moves toward a more formal system.
A third possible reason for the lack of many new interstate cases could

relate to concerns that no one international court has exclusive authority to
18. For an overview of activity by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, see WTO,
Overview of the state-of-play of WTO disputes, < http:lwww.wto.orglwtoldispute
[bulletin.htm>. For discussion of the binding nature of WTO panel decisions, see John H.
Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandingon the Nature of Legal
Obligation, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1997).
19. Before January 1, 1995, GATT panel decisions could be blocked by the
disadvantaged state. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding, Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, in General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1216 (1994), removes that blocking option, establishes a firm timetable for cases,
and creates a new appellate procedure. The significant WTO caseload has led some to argue in
favor of an even more formal court with independent judges, rather than panelists selected by the
parties, to decide trade disputes. See, e.g., PresentationSummary and Comments, 32 INT'L LAW.
883, 891 (1998) (comments of John Kingery); Alan Win. Wolff, Reflections on WTO Dispute
Settlement, 32 INT'L LAW. 951, 955 (1998).
Another example of an active, evolving international third-party dispute settlement system is
the one created by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. In the early years of this system, the European
Commission on Human Rights screened out most cases as inadmissible, and some states refused to
accept two optional Convention clauses involving (1) a right of individual petition to the
Commission and (2) acceptance of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The
system evolved, however, with all member states eventually accepting the optional clauses and the
Court's caseload continually increasing. On Nov. 1, 1998, Protocol No. 11 to the Convention
entered into force; this Protocol eliminates the Commission, restructures the Court to
accommodate its significant caseload, and allows individuals to bring cases directly to the Court.
See generally MARK JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1995).
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interpret the Law of the Sea Convention. If a state wants a definitive
interpretation of some Convention rule, might it be discouraged from bringing
a case to one forum because it recognizes the risk that different tribunals may
interpret the rule in other cases, and the concomitant risk that inconsistent
jurisprudence could develop? In my opinion, the concern that the variety of
fora available to hear law of the sea disputes could damage the development of
consistent jurisprudence-a point some have raised as a systemic criticism of

the Convention -is probably overblown.

It also seems more likely that, on

balance, the availability of multiple fora will increase the chances that states
could find a forum with a composition and procedure they like. Any state that
has a dispute with another state must determine that pursuing a claim in some
forum will not unacceptably upset friendly relations or disrupt negotiations on
other, unrelated matters. If a variety of fora are available, however, the
probability increases that at least one acceptable forum will be found, either for
filing a claim unilaterally or for pursuing a ruling that, at the time the case is
brought, all the parties to the dispute desire.
The extent to which the number of interstate cases involving law of the sea
disputes will increase remains unclear. Certainly, as in the past, many cases
will continue to be brought to a court or tribunal by special agreement.' It may
well be, however, that the Convention's dispute settlement provisions will have
their main impact not in terms of new case law, but behind the scenes. For
example, these provisions may deter some states from making outrageous
unilateral claims that could be legally challenged before a third party, and may
influence the conduct of interstate negotiations.
Although my focus thus far has been on the application of the Law of the
Sea Convention's dispute settlement provisions to states, the Convention does
not limit the jurisdiction of the various courts and tribunals to interstate disputes
(although the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that "[o]nly
states may be parties in cases before the Court"23). The fact that the
Convention's dispute settlement mechanisms are in some situations open to
20.
For discussion of some of the criticism, see Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute
Settlement and InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 76-89 (1997).
21.

Although different tribunals may in theory develop different legal interpretations of

rules of law of the sea, one tribunal may gain a virtual monopoly over some types of cases. For
example, the ITLOS, with its residuary compulsory jurisdiction under Article 292, should attract
virtually all prompt releases cases. Furthermore, one should not necessarily assume that different
tribunals will interpret an international law rule differently. The judges on one court or tribunal
may well rely on decisions of another tribunal (although international courts and tribunals may

place more reliance on their own prior decisions and on ICJ decisions than on decisions of other
tribunals). See id. at 72-73.
22.

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE PRESS COMMUNIQUt 98/35, Nov. 2,

1998 (Indonesia and Malaysia bring to the ICJ, by special agreement, a dispute concerning
sovereignty over two islands in the Celebes Sea).
23.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. No. 993.
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non-state entities may lead to increased use of third-party fora. It is true the
Convention provides no general individual right of access to courts or tribunals
for wide categories of disputes. Such a right of access is a feature of some of
the busiest international courts and tribunals. This lack of assured individual

access is not surprising, given the historical period in which the Law of the Sea
Convention was negotiated, and given the fact that the international law of the
sea has not traditionally been conceptualized in terms of human rights.' But
the Convention does provide several options for non-state entities to be parties
to cases. Some of these options apply to disputes related to sea-bed mining

contracts and other disputes arising under Part XI.'

In addition, states may

authorize individuals to pursue prompt release applications under Article 292.'

Furthermore, because the Convention's dispute settlement provisions apply
generally to "States Parties," and because the definition of "States Parties"
encompasses some non-state entities, such entities may be parties in a wide
range of cases.' Finally, the Statute of the Law of the Sea Tribunal could be
read to allow the ITLOS to exercise jurisdiction over cases submitted pursuant
to an "agreement" to which non-state entities are parties.' If the Statute were
to be construed in this manner, port states and ship owners could, for example,

enter into agreements to refer to the Tribunal disputes about the application of
24. That the international law of the sea has not traditionally been viewed primarily in
terms of individual human rights does not mean that the Law of the Sea Convention ignores such
rights. Indeed, as Professor Oxman has demonstrated, numerous Convention provisions recognize
and protect civil and economic rights. See Bernard H. Oxman, Human Rights and the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 399 (1997).
Furthermore, courts or tribunals with jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea Convention are
directed to apply not only the Convention, but "other rules of international law not incompatible
with" it. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 4, art. 293. These "other rules" could, in
appropriate cases, include generally accepted human rights norms.
25. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 4, arts. 187(c)-(f), 190.
26. See id. art. 292(2) (suggesting States Parties may authorize private parties to make
applications on behalf of States Parties in Article 292 prompt release proceedings); Bernard H.
Oxman, Observations on Vessel Release under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 11 INT'L. J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 201 (1997).
27. The definition of "States Parties" covers, for example, the European Union. See
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1(2)(2), 305(1).
28. According to the Statute of the ITLOS, the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction, inter
alia, over "all matters specifically provided for in any ... agreement which confers jurisdiction on
the Tribunal," id. Annex VI, art. 21, and entities other than States Parties have access to the
Tribunal "in any case submitted pursuant to" any such agreement. Id. Annex VI, art. 20. As an
annex to the Convention, the Statute of the ITLOS is considered an integral part of the
Convention. See id. art. 318. However, the general jurisdictional provision of the Convention,
Article 288, refers to jurisdiction pursuant to "international agreements," i.e., treaties, rather than
"agreements," and the Tribunal has not yet indicated that it will accept jurisdiction over nonseabed-mining disputes submitted pursuant to agreements to which natural or juridical persons are
parties. See generally 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 6,
A.VI.112-.128.

1999]

Noyes

standards of the International Maritime Organization or about Memoranda of
Understanding on Port State Control. 9
How many cases the various fora referred to in the Law of the Sea
Convention actually hear will depend in large part on how they conduct their
business. For example, the ITLOS can, if it chooses, do much to build a
track record that deserves respect and attracts business. The question of
what the Tribunal should do to achieve these goals is not one that should be
answered in the abstract. The functions it performs in, say, a maritime
delimitation case will be far different from its functions in a sea-bed mining
dispute involving a challenge to regulations of the Sea-Bed Authority. But let
me suggest briefly a few factors that may be relevant to the acceptance of the
Tribunal. The Tribunal already has set itself up as a body that can act
quickly. It handed down its first decision only three weeks after the
application was filed. This efficiency may help it to attract cases and to
compete effectively with other available fora. The Tribunal also has
established several chambers, including a Chamber on Fisheries Matters, a
Chamber on the Marine Environment, and a Chamber of Summary
Procedure, that are available at the request of parties to a dispute." Parties
thus may choose fora able to act more quickly than the full Tribunal, or fora
whose members have a particular subject-matter expertise.
Sometimes the Tribunal's natural desire to attract business may conflict
with the goal of rendering decisions that will be widely respected. For
example, in its first decision, the Tribunal ordered a coastal state to release a
detained foreign flag vessel and its crew on the posting of a reasonable
bond. The Tribunal set a low burden-an "arguable or sufficiently plausible"
standard-that the applicant flag state had to satisfy with respect to one essential
allegation in order for the Tribunal to rule in its favor.3' This standard may
help to attract some submissions from states whose flag vessels have been
detained by a coastal state. But, the standard arguably does violence to the
balance the Convention strikes concerning the scope of permissible third-party
oversight of coastal state activities in their EEZs, making it too easy to subject
coastal state detentions of foreign flag vessels to international judicial review.32
In general, the Tribunal is most likely to gain support among its various
audiences-international institutions, private parties, states, and national
courts--called on to implement prompt release orders or other rulings if it does
29. E.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Caribbean Region,
Feb. 9, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 231 (1996).
30. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 4, Annex VI, art. 15; International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Rules of the Tribunal, arts. 28-31, ITLOS/8, Oct. 28, 1997,
<http://www.un.org/Depts.los/Irules-e.htm>; Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Law of the Sea,
Report of the Secretary-General, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 39, 37, U.N. Doc. A/52/487 (1997).
31. See The "MN Saiga" (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea),
51,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/judgl.htm> (1997).
32. I develop this theme in John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1998).
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not assert bold and innovative interpretations of the Convention, and if it exerts
its authority only incrementally. 33
The scope of application of the third-party dispute settlement provisions of
the Law of the Sea Convention will be broadened if they are incorporated by
reference in other treaties. The 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement already uses
this technique.' Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of that
Agreement can be pursued through the dispute settlement mechanisms of the
Law of the Sea Convention. Thus, when that Agreement enters into force,
each party to it and the United States is already a party-will be subject to the
third-party dispute settlement mechanisms of the Law of the Sea Convention.
This is true even for states (such as the United States) that have not accepted the
1982 Convention. Future bilateral and regional treaties also could authorize
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention. Alternatively, of course, a treaty may simply confer jurisdiction
on one particular tribunal, such as the Law of the Sea Tribunal.35
In sum, the third-party dispute settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea
Convention may lead to a gradual increase in judicial and arbitral activity, and
thus to some important new contributions to the international law of the sea.
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in particular, could see an
increase in business if it acts with impartiality and demonstrates its ability to
render well-reasoned decisions quickly and efficiently. Development of such a
record could persuade states and other entities to use the Tribunal even when
the Convention itself does not give the Tribunal residuary compulsory
jurisdiction. States may refer disputes to the Tribunal via special agreements or
compromissory clauses in treaties, and some non-state entities might also
regard the Tribunal as their preferred dispute settlement forum.

33.

See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective

SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Mark W, Janis, The European Court of
Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 105, 108-14

(Mark W. Janis ed., 1992).

34. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature
Dec. 4, 1995, arts. 7(4)-(6), 27-32, A/CONF.167/37, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (not yet in force).
35. E.g., Draft Agreement on Free Transit Through the Territory of Croatia to and From
the Port of Ploce and Through the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Neum, Sept. 8, 1998,
art. 9(2), Croat.-Bosn. & Herz. This Draft Agreement names the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea as the body to nominate a member of a decision-making Commission, a
nonjudicial matter over which the Tribunal arguably has jurisdiction under its Statute. See Law of
the Sea Convention, supra note 4, Annex VI, art. 21. See also id. art. 282.

